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Abstract
Indigenous societies around the world are stepping forward to assert their place as an equal
partner in their nation’s future. In many cases, these efforts have been undertaken in response
to the development and the 2007 publication of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples , as endorsed by the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations.
Governments also have begun to reconsider their stance on the associated issues. The digital
texts of 189 international constitutions – as offered by the Constitute
Web site – were
examined for occurrences of the four tokens indigenous, aboriginal, and Indian or Indians to
yield country indices. Documents from forty countries were found to contain the
term indigenous and seven possessed aboriginal (N uses = 320 and 19, respectively). The more
familiar token Indian, or its plural, occurred 88 times in ten of these political affirmations.

“We are not myths of the past, ruins in the jungle, or zoos. We are people and we
want to be respected, not to be victims of intolerance and racism.” – Rigoberta
Menchú Tum

Article 161A of the Constitution of Malaysia directly concerns the legal status of the inhabitants
of the States of Sabah and Sarawak, those residents of the two bordering areas in northern
Borneo where the latter surrounds the Nation of Brunei. Within this Article, the definition in
Clause 6 of the term native is applied in different manners to the occupants of these two
regions:

•

a) “in relation to Sarawak, a person who is a citizen and either belongs to one of
the races specified in Clause (7) as indigenous to the State or is of mixed blood
deriving exclusively from those races; and

•

b) in relation to Sabah, a person who is a citizen, is the child or grandchild of a
person of a race indigenous to Sabah, and was born (whether on or after Malaysia
Day or not) either in Sabah or to a father domiciled in Sabah at the time of the
birth.”

Clause 7 declared that “[t]he races to be treated for the purposes of the definition of ‘native’ in
Clause (6) as indigenous to Sarawak are the Bukitans, Bisayahs, Dusuns, Sea Dayaks, Land
Dayaks, Kadayans, Kalabit, Kayans, Kenyahs (including Sabups and Sipengs), Kajangs (including
Sekapans, Kejamans, Lahanans, Punans, Tanjongs and Kanowits), Lugats, Lisums, Malays,
Melanos, Muruts, Penans, Sians, Tagals, Tabuns and Ukits” (see Zakaria, 1995, pp. 99-100;
emphasis added).[1]

Western observers would most likely be hard pressed to recognize beyond the Malays any of
these named entities, yet the very creation in September 1963 of this national statement
pinpoints the exact opportunity and – more so, the inherent responsibility – to declare a portion
of Malaysia’s composition. The identification of those ethnic groups is a far cry from the almost
lackadaisical approach that the United States took when it declared administrative control over
its own indigenous peoples by specifying that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes” (The
Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, 2004, p. 168;
emphasis added). Half a decade after that Malaysian stance was added to its constitution,
President Lyndon Johnson’s The Forgotten American speech in 1968 only began to advocate for
diverting the United States away from a policy of tribal termination of, and towards one of selfdetermination for, these unique original nations. He claimed that the federal government had
observed “a new concept of community development – a concept based on self-help – work
successfully among Indians” (Johnson, 1968, p. 440), even though the President also admitted
that the American Indian “has been an alien in his own land” (p. 438). In the meantime, and
within the Malaysian identity, those nearly thirty enumerated subpopulations were understood as
important fundamental contributors to the social fabric of the Borneo State of Sarawak, in a way
that the Inuit of Canada would similarly announce, in their own language, that they are the
people of the Arctic (Damas, 1984, p. 7). Yet in many other locales in the twenty-first century’s
universe of political affairs, the world’s indigenous peoples are still at risk. The 1992 Guatemalan
Nobel Peace Prize winner of Mayan descent, Rigoberta Menchú Tum , is just one native citizen
driven to acquire basic human rights for, and to overcome governmental abuse of, indigenous
peoples.
In part, the international scope of this difficulty has been hindered by the absence of an exact
definition of the term indigenous. The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations
, after many years of contemplation, formulated the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples
upon the assertion that “[i]ndigenous communities, peoples and nations are those
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed
on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of
society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems”
(Study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations, 1987, paragraph 379, p.
29).[2] The absence of a consistent definition for what an indigenous group may comprise is
confounded by the United Nations’ own declaration in August 2013 that “[w]ith more than 5,000
distinct indigenous groups in some 90 countries, indigenous people make up more than 5 per
cent of the world’s population, representing 370 million people.”[3] The organization also “urged
governments to honour the treaties and agreements established with their indigenous groups,
stressing that respecting official policies is the only way to maintain peace and advance
development” (UN stresses importance of honouring treaties between states and indigenous
groups, 2013).
It is precisely the pre-invasion and pre-colonial attributes that frequently separate a nation’s
older native societies from its present and much broader foreign infiltration. The massive multinational emigration to the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for
example, swamped any semblance of sustained federal recognition of the sovereignty of virtually
every American Indian tribe. The waffling among the four policies of tribal extermination,
assimilation, termination, and self-determination in the century preceding Johnson’s Forgotten
American proposal reflected the utter absence of a coherent Indian Affairs program in the United
States.

The terms indigenous, aboriginal, and Indian(s)
The Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples employed the term indigenous to identify
this selected component of a population in the most comprehensive and inclusive sense:
“indigenous communities, peoples and nations.” It is pertinent that The Oxford English
Dictionary (1989b, p. 867; emphasis added) indicates that the term may be used to denote
“born or produced naturally in a land or region; native or belonging naturally to (the soil, region,
etc.). (Used primarily of aboriginal inhabitants or natural products).” As one demonstration of an
earlier evocation of the word, Article 2 of the 1917 Political Constitution of the United Mexican
States professed that “[t]he Nation has a multicultural composition which has its roots in its
indigenous peoples, comprising those who have descended from the people who inhabited the
present territory of the country at the beginning of the colonization and who have preserved at
least partially their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions” (see Wolfrum and
Grote, 2008, p. 1; emphasis added). This statement – including the collective noun indigenous
peoples and the phrase comprising those who have descended from the people who inhabited
the present territory of the country at the beginning of the colonization – was a precursor to the
subsequent, yet parallel, proposed parameters of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.
The cross-linkage between indigenous and aboriginal is similarly echoed in the definition of the
latter in the Dictionary: “First or earliest so far as history or science gives record; primitive;
strictly native, indigenous. Used both of the races and natural features of various lands” (1989a,
p. 35; emphasis added). In the literature, the capitalized form Aboriginal has been used to
identify the original inhabitants of Australia. Withnell (1901, p. iii) forewarned over a century ago
of the demise of these natives of northwestern Australia by remarking that “[s]ince the discovery
of gold and the consequential influx of population… it is only a matter of time when they will
become extinct.” Further, aboriginal has been used to pinpoint a select contingent of citizens
within Canada. Section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 acknowledged that “In this Act,
‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada” (see InterUniversity Associates, 1999, p. 69; McCabe, 2010, pp. 120-142 for more on §35; and Aboriginal
Law Handbook, 2012, pp. 6-8; emphasis added).[4] Thus, there is evidence that the two
tokens indigenous and aboriginal have been used over time by governments to recognize specific
constituents of their population for consideration within their constitutions. In this simple
example of the fundamental documents of Mexico and Canada, contrasts may be conducted
between the usages of the terms to learn more about the perspectives of these nations upon
their own compositions. Expanding the search for these two terms to a more complete
international examination would offer a truly comprehensive viewpoint of the ways that these
collectives have been considered.[5]
During the early years of the United States, the use of indigenous and aboriginal in official
government documents was almost nonexistent. A search of the Readex digital American State
Papers, covering the interval of the first to the twenty-fifth Congress over the years 1789
through 1839, yielded just 25 and 31 occurrences of these two terms, respectively. The initial
employment of indigenous took place in the 1794 material entitled France (1832b, p. 352), while
the first usage of aboriginal may be found in the 1797 Inaugural speech of President John Adams
(1832, p. 38). As an overpowering comparison, the more North American token Indian or its
plural appeared in over 1,400 documents within the American State Papers during the same
period, even if a few uses of the word surfaced in phrases such as West Indian or Corn, Indian.[6]

Contemporary reflections on indigenous and aboriginal issues
To be fair, the consideration of indigenous peoples has come a long way since the United States
communicated its constitution in 1789. However, the legacy of treaty negotiations between the
United States federal government and the tribes has served as a model of what can go adrift

when more thought is not placed upon the needs of aboriginal populations. [7] Today, many
nations have more carefully addressed their relationship with all their resident peoples, even if
only through giving voice to more appropriate constitutional strictures. The process of that
analysis, however, has revealed an almost bottomless crevasse, since the uncovering of past
difficulties with one group or tribe – often inherited from colonial times – frequently leads to the
unveiling of another problem, either within a single country or across an entire continent.
Canessa (2007, p. 198) acknowledged one such forceful burst when he noted that two-thirds of
the entire census population of Bolivia now claim to be indigenous and that this statistic includes
as a claimant the country’s President, Evo Morales (see Kohl, 2010). As will be seen below,
Bolivia’s recent constitutional revisions (see Flanz and Ward, 2004a) included a full
reconsideration of the place of indigenous peoples in the Bolivian future; many other Latin
American nations have adapted their viewpoints as well. Still, Negretto (2012, p. 749; emphasis
added) remarked that “[s]ince 1978, all the countries of Latin America have either replaced or
amended their constitutions. Replacement and amendment are, however, substantively different
means of constitutional transformation. While the replacement of the existing constitution
involves a political decision to re-create the basic legal structure of the state, amendments, like
judicial interpretation, are mechanisms of legal adaptation that preserve the continuity of the
constitution in a changing environment. The frequent replacement of constitutions thus puts into
question the legal and political foundations of democratic regimes.”[8] Thus, it would appear that
a country’s willingness to make changes to its national underpinnings carries with it a potential
difficulty, regardless of the premise – benevolent or otherwise – for those proposed
modifications. Mending today the abuse bestowed over centuries upon Bolivia’s indigenous
groups may consequently instill fresh difficulties.
Nevertheless, several important international court cases over the last few decades have fueled
endeavors to reach a more meaningful consensus on basic aspects of this issue:

•

the case of Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973) before the
Supreme Court of Canada in 1972 confirmed for the first time in that country the
existence of an aboriginal right to land;

•

the 1992 Mabo and Others v. Queensland proceedings at the High Court of
Australia rejected the concept of terra nullius and instead recognized native title.
The opinion noted that in previous times “[i]nternational law recognized conquest,
cession, and occupation of territory that was terra nullius as three of the effective
ways of acquiring sovereignty” (Mabo and Others v. Queensland, 1992, paragraph
33; see Ewing, 1993);

•

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) concluded that indigenous peoples have a
constitutional right to own and control their aboriginal lands (see Dacks, 2002);

•

the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2002 decided that the Sumu Indians
of Nicaragua had the right to determine whether their timber lands could be cut
(The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001; see Anaya
and Crider, 1996);

•

indigenous mineral rights in South Africa were assessed by the Constitutional
Court when the Nama asserted their entitlement to ancestral lands (Richtersveld
Community and Others v. Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2003; see Ülgen, 2002); and

•

the Malaysian Court of Appeal (Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v. Sagong Bin Tasi
& Ors, 2005, p. 292; see Nah, 2008) substantiated the Temuan tribe’s contention
that they owned their land, and concluded that its use by the government required
“[a]dequate compensation.”

These actions form only a small subdivision of recent litigation, yet each illuminated the
transition from long-standing views of the limited rights of indigenous peoples to new
perspectives that had virtually been forced upon all litigants by some intersection of modernity
and traditional ways linked to immemorial land holdings. Therefore, countries have been
compelled in part to revisit the attendant historical patterns of use, occupancy, and land tenure
by their aboriginal groups that recent court decisions have begun to recognize as critical data for
opinion formation.[9] The discovery of the existence of previous supporting documentation for
such claims furnishes the evidence now required by many jurisdictions. Nevertheless, these
inquiries through their sheer existence undoubtedly influenced the path of the United Nations
Working Group on Indigenous Populations.
To add to the melee, the 2007 vote for the adoption of the Group’s Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples
was supported by 143 nations. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States were dissenting countries. These nations have struggled with their past aboriginal
controversies. Initially, they “could not support [the Declaration] because of concerns over
provisions on self-determination, land and resources rights and, among others, language giving
indigenous peoples a right of veto over national legislation and State management of resources”
(see the United Nations news release
for this vote), but by the end of 2010, this quartet had
relented and endorsed the decree (Pulitano, 2012, p. 2).[10]

A constitution search tool
Constitute
is the result of a partnership between the Comparative Constitutions Project
(CCP) and Google. The CCP began as a program to collect world constitutions for comparison
by legal and political science professionals. It serves as an information source for constitutional
reform by governments and consultants through the process of collecting and providing access to
a wide array of such instruments. With funding provided by Google Ideas, the CCP content is
now available to Internet users, researchers, and scholars. Constitute is presented as a timely
and relevant Web-based resource, without a fee, of world constitutions that permits users to
evaluate these documents during study or review and/or for the creation of new variants.[11] In a
statement regarding its perceived mandate, the CCP declared that its intent “is to investigate the
sources and consequences of constitutional choices. Towards this end, the investigators are
collecting data on the formal characteristics of written constitutions, both current and historical,
for most independent states since 1789.” Previously, the three principal study members
published The Endurance of National Constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, 2009, p. 51) in
which they described “a universe of 935 new constitutional systems, of which 746 have been
replaced or suspended, and 189 are still in force.” The Appendix to that volume furnished a
catalogue of these statements (see pp. 215-221), and in October 2013, the CCP released
its Constitute
site to supply searchable digital texts of these materials.

Document population
An initial appraisal determined that the United Nations
consists of 193 member states, while
the Constitute database contained 189 national entries, a suite almost completely composed of
those nations identified in the Appendix of The Endurance of National Constitutions.[12] The latter
assembly included the documents of two non-members of the United Nations – Kosovo and
Taiwan – and the United Nations list tallied several representatives that did not appear as entries
in the digital collection, i.e., the six countries of Egypt, Fiji, New Zealand, San Marino, Tunisia,
and the United Kingdom were absent from Constitute.[13] However, Fiji
released a new
constitution in 2013 that exhibits two uses of indigenous in its Preamble; the Appendix denotes a
previous version from 1997 (p. 217). The expectation is that these last few official statements
will find their way into a more complete version of the Constitute database, but activities such as
the suspension of Egypt’s 1971 constitution in July 2013 (Hauslohner, Booth, and al-Hourani,
2013) or the introduction in the following month of this new announcement by Fiji are events

that temporarily hinder the completion of an ensemble such as this. Since those Fijian data were
derived from outside the Constitute universe, they were not counted in the results of this
investigation.[14] Nevertheless, the scope of this digital endeavor now permits interrogation of the
fundamental political declarations of almost all current United Nations members.[15]

User interface
Users may browse and download all available constitutions in PDF or HTML formats. One can
consider the countries as an entire list, or filter one or more constitutions by continent and
country, with the ability to search within the parameters selected. The filter-by-date option
allows the user to scan a specific date range, with the ability to comb through these results. A
handy guide is the indicator at the top of the page – the “Search results” – that records the
number of returned constitutions containing the inquiry term.
The search bar is easy to navigate and is positioned across the top of each Constitute webpage.
If a selected keyword is included in the Topics list, then autocomplete suggestions of relevant
options appear to assist the user. The Topic search feature provides eleven pre-determined
subjects such as Election or Legislature by tree search. This allows the user to review relevant
material in detailed order or explore more deeply into the corresponding constitutions. In the
present study, this suite was perused for the occurrences of the individual
terms indigenous, aboriginal, and Indian or Indians. The resulting outcomes for each relevant
country were examined and the text locations of the retrieved items were collected together
under categories of documents that exhibited each of these tokens, with the restriction that the
results for the Indian and Indians probes were gathered to form a single Indians(s) class.

Search outcomes
Table I (Download Excel File) conveys the results of those Constitute assessments for the
individual terms indigenous, aboriginal, and Indian(s). The instances revealed forty nations
with indigenous exemplars in their documents, seven more with the aboriginal token, and ten
countries that wrote Indian(s) into their declarations. The first column of the Table (Download
Excel File) arranges the identified countries and their version data, as taken from
the Constitute site. Column 2 enumerates the total number of token occurrences within each
instrument, and columns 3 through 6 itemize the locations of those incidences. The actual
number of text citations in these last few columns may be less than the total number of recorded
tokens, since some sentences or sections engaged more than a single usage of a term. For
example, Colombia’s constitution invoked the term indigenous two times within the same
sentence when it stated in Article 171 that “[t]he representatives of the indigenous communities
who aspire to become members of the Senate of the Republic must have exercised a position of
traditional authority in their respective community or have been leaders of
an indigenous organization, which qualification will be verified by a certificate from the respective
organization, endorsed by the Minister of the Government” (see Wolfrum and Grote, 2005, p. 49;
emphasis added). Titles of chapters, or of sections, on occasion included these terms: in
Canada’s document, Part II is named “Rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada,” and the title
of Article 25 is “Aboriginal rights and freedoms not affected by Charter” (emphasis added).
Three nations – Malaysia, Panama, and Peru – were found to employ both of
the indigenous and aboriginal terms in their constitutions and so their names are bolded in
the Table (Download Excel File) to signify that distinction. Brazil, Colombia, Panama, and
Singapore are underlined for the presence of indigenous and Indian(s) in their charters. Canada
and Panama have their names in italics since they make use of aboriginal and Indian(s), while
Panama is capitalized because its document exhibits all three words: indigenous, aboriginal,
and Indian.

Observations
The disparity between forty national documents employing the term indigenous and just seven
using aboriginal is interesting. The smaller grouping of aboriginal users is highlighted by the total
term counts shown in Table I (Download Excel File): Canada’s twelve uses far overshadow the
limited application of the term by the remaining countries (N uses = 5).[16] The Canadian
applications arise almost exclusively in Article 35 that addresses the “Rights of
the aboriginal peoples of Canada,” and in particular in §2 that describes these very people: “In
this Act, ‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada”
(emphasis added). Overall, there appears to be three general categories of the indigenous token:
those countries’ statements with less than 10 presentations, like Argentina and Cameroon; those
with more than ten and up to just less than 30 such tokens, as issued by Colombia and Mexico;
and the 127 instances conveyed by Bolivia’s document.
It is clear from these findings that a research tool like Constitute can offer a true international
perspective. As Table I (Download Excel File) illustrates, the outcomes represent nations from
North and South America, from Africa, from Asia, and from the Pacific. Only Finland and
Switzerland are part of the continent that in the past instituted much of the worldwide distress
for indigenous peoples. Here, Finland declares that “[t]he Sami, as an indigenous people, as well
as the Roma and other groups, have the right to maintain and develop their own language and
culture. Provisions on the right of the Sami to use the Sami language before the authorities are
laid down by an Act. The rights of persons using sign language and of persons in need of
interpretation or translation aid owing to disability shall be guaranteed by an Act” (see Wolfrum
and Grote, 2006, p. 5; emphasis added). These Sami are better known internationally as the
reindeer-herding Lapps, very much an indigenous group residing in the far north (Errico and
Hocking, 2008), but not necessarily a society that might come to mind during a discussion
of indigenous peoples.[17]
Within a nation-by-nation comparison, the presence of 127 indigenous terms in Bolivia’s
constitution is in marked contrast to many other countries that have made a similar inclusive
effort with regard to their native peoples. By employing a style similar to that used to enumerate
the groups in Article 161A of the Constitution of Malaysia, Article 5 §1 of the Bolivian instrument
broadcasts that the “official languages of the State are Spanish and all the languages of the rural
native indigenous nations and peoples,” and Article 10 states that “[t]he languages and dialects
of ethnic groups are also official in their territories. The education provided in communities with
their own linguistic traditions will be bilingual” (see Wolfrum and Grote, 2005, p. 2; emphasis
added). This declaration is accompanied by the names of three dozen such ethnic entities, all of
which may be quite unfamiliar beyond Bolivia: “Aymara, Araona, Baure, Bésiro, Canichana,
Cavineño, Cayubaba, Chácobo, Chimán, Ese Ejja, Guaraní, Guarasu’we, Guarayu, Itonama, Leco,
Machajuyai-kallawaya, Machineri, Maropa, Mojeñotrinitario, Mojeño-ignaciano, Moré, Mosetén,
Movima, Pacawara, Puquina, Quechua, Sirionó, Tacana, Tapiete, Toromona, Uruchipaya,
Weenhayek, Yaminawa, Yuki, Yuracaré and Zamuco.”[18]

Chola cook. Photograph by Frank G. Carpenter, circa 1900-1923,
as part of his Carpenter’s World Travels series.
(Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division; image LC-USZ62-136385)
Mexico (N = 28 citations) and Colombia (N =19) have charters with the next most frequent
employment of indigenous, but in both cases and unlike the Bolivian manuscript, no specific
group names were provided. This unspecific use may be seen in Mexico’s Article 2 that remarks
that “[t]he Nation has a multicultural composition which has its roots in its indigenous peoples,
comprising those who have descended from the people who inhabited the present territory of the
country at the beginning of the colonization and who have preserved at least partially their own
social, economic, cultural, and political institutions” (see Wolfrum and Grote, 2008, p. 1;
emphasis added), and in Colombia’s general statement that “[t]he exploitation of the natural
resources in the indigenous territories will be done without impairing the cultural, social, and
economic integrity of the indigenous communities. In the decisions adopted with respect to said
exploitation, the Government will encourage the participation of the representatives of the
respective communities” (Paragraph portion of Article 330; see Wolfrum and Grote, 2005, p.
108; emphasis added).

Alternatively, the constitution of Nepal (N = 13 occurrences) assured the fundamental right of
equality by stating that “[t]he State shall not discriminate against citizens among citizens on
grounds of religion, race, caste, tribe, sex, origin, language or ideological conviction or any of
these. Provided that nothing shall be deemed to prevent the making of special provisions by law
for the protection, empowerment or advancement of women, Dalits, indigenous peoples (Adibasi,
Janajati), Madhesi or farmers, workers, economically, socially or culturally backward classes or
children, the aged and the disabled or those who are physically or mentally incapacitated”
(Article 13 §3; see Wolfrum and Grote, 2007, p. 8; emphasis added). Article 21 additionally
promised to these groups the right to social justice: “The economically, socially or educationally
backward women, Dalits, indigenous peoples, Madhesi communities, oppressed classes, poor
farmers and labors shall have the right to take part in the structures of the State on the basis of
the principle of ‘proportional inclusion’” (p. 10; emphasis added).
In contrast with these contemporary indigenous or aboriginal revisions, the older yet more
familiar American token Indian or its plural is written eighty-eight times into only ten
international documents: for that of Brazil (N = 6 instances), Canada (N = 3), Colombia (N = 5),
Cuba (N = 1), India (N = 59), Mozambique (N = 1), Panama (N = 1), Singapore (N = 8),
Somalia (N = 1); and the United States (N = 3). Absent the clear necessity of the term in
virtually any official national document from India, Mozambique and Somalia couple the term
once with ocean – as Indian Ocean – to provide a geographic reference within their texts;
Singapore referred to a resident minority derived from its geographic neighbor; and Brazil,
Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Panama, and the United States devoted the term to label their nations’
original inhabitants. The existence of this proper noun in the lexicon of the last six New World
countries undoubtedly was influenced by the arrival of Christopher Columbus in 1492, who
believed that his voyage had in fact terminated in India and so identified the observed residents
as Indians.[19] Only Colombia and Panama used the singular form, while the latter remains
distinctive among all these nations by the inclusion of all three particular tokens
– indigenous, aboriginal, and Indian – within its constitution. Cuba made use of the word in
perhaps the most forceful nationalistic manner, when it declared “We, Cuban citizens, heirs and
continuators of the creative work and the traditions of combativity, firmness, heroism and
sacrifice fostered by our ancestors; by the Indians who preferred extermination to submission;
by the slaves who rebelled against their masters; by those who awoke the national
consciousness and the ardent Cuban desire for an independent homeland and liberty;…” at the
onset of its document’s preamble (see Flanz and Ward, 2004b, p. 3, emphasis added). [20]
The occurrence of paired constitutional exemplars of indigenous and aboriginal (Malaysia,
Panama, and Peru), of indigenous and Indian(s) (Brazil, Columbia, Panama, and Singapore), and
of aboriginal and Indian(s) (Canada and Panama) in this digital resource imparts a special social
perspective to the documents. Nations such as Colombia or Canada, but especially Panama with
all three terms, thereby pledged to consider more segments of their people: it has been noted
that an indigenous President leads Colombia, and Canada has declared that the Indian, Inuit,
and Métis form its aboriginal peoples (McCabe, 2010, pp. 120-142; emphasis added). For the
latter nation, the collective Métis denotes a community consisting of Indian and French
descendants – primarily through intermarriage during the 18th and 19th centuries – that
developed a composite language based upon Plains Cree and Canadian French, coupled to
Saulteaux or Ojibwa (see Payment, 2001, p. 661). Slobodin (1981, p. 361) remarked that “[t]he
Métis form a regional example of a social and demographic phenomenon that has marked the
frontiers of European colonial expansion in the post-Renaissance era: the ‘mixed’ population,” a
description that may be applied to the makeup of many New World countries and one that is
echoed today in the use of the constitutional applications of the tokens indigenous, aboriginal,
and Indian(s).
Furthermore, this very assertion by nations like Canada stimulates concern for the issue of
indigenous restitution. Morse (2008, p. 271) used Canada’s own constitutional definition to
illuminate this very problem: “Simply put, the history of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples

(who are now described as ‘aboriginal people’ in s 32(2) of a portion of the Canadian Constitution
added in 1982), since extensive contact with Europeans began over four centuries ago, has been
horrendous. It is replete with instances of virtually unimaginable suffering through, for example,
territorial dispossession, theft of traditional lands, exploitation, violence frequently amounting to
instances of genocide, oppression of cultural practices and religious beliefs, denial of legitimate
sovereignty held by their governments, wholesale removal of generations of children to be
brutalized in church-run residential schools, as well as gross over-representation in prisons and
child welfare systems.” There is no doubt that considerable legal work remains – and not
exclusively in Canada – even if nations are committed to fashioning or to adjusting their
instruments with relevant parameters that more directly target the needs of their original
peoples. On a more general scale, however, Christie (2009, p. 231) warns that “[i]t is
indisputable that much of the ‘heavy work’ of colonialism has been carried out by the law, and
indeed by the construction of the dominant system on a foundation of racist and colonial
theoretical presumptions and positions.” In the United States, and as cultural norms continue to
evolve there, the ability of native populations to speak up and be heard has improved. The
December 2012 purchase of Pe’ Sla, the sacred land in South Dakota used for ceremonies by the
Oceti Sakowin, or the Great Sioux Nation, is a recent example of American Indian tribes working
together to reclaim historic lands (South Dakota: Tribes raise money for sacred lands, 2012).
However, when the opportunity does arise, the creation of tribal constitutions has occasionally
been found to be problematic, even when expedited by government encouragement or decree.
Gover (2009) described tribal membership provisions contained in the constitutions of forty-eight
New Zealand Treaty Settlement Entities and thirty-eight Australian Registered Native Title Bodies
Corporate, where the former are a subset of recognized groups under the 1840 Treaty of
Waitangi settlement process.[21] She concluded that “the constitutions and rules they contain can
be expressions of evolving cultural production of customary norms” (p. 228), precisely
the societal mechanism needed to overcome the colonial legal stagnation that confounds the
status of indigenous peoples. In a later publication, she enumerated those recognized American
Indian tribes and First Nations of Canada (2010, pp. 213-230)[22] that have initiated changes to
their definitions of membership criteria,[23] but the American process is thwarted by a debilitating
barrier wherein tribes must “submit all constitutional amendments to the Secretary of the
Interior for approval” (p. 118), a parameter originally specified in §16 of the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act (48 Stat. 984, 987): “Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same
reservation, shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an
appropriate constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective when ratified by a majority
vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult Indians residing on such reservation, as
the case may be, at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe. Such constitution and bylaws when
ratified as aforesaid and approved by the Secretary of the Interior shall be revocable by an
election open to the same voters and conducted in the same manner as hereinabove provided.
Amendments to the constitution and bylaws may be ratified and approved by the Secretary in
the same manner as the original constitution and bylaws.” In a complementary suite to the
international items found in Constitute, the Library of Congress makes available over 400 of
these digitized constitutions and corporate charters, partitioned by tribe or community within six
areas of the United States: Arctic Alaska
(N = 124), Northeast Atlantic
(N = 1), North
Central
(N = 58), New Southwest
(N = 84), Pacific Northwest
(N = 40), and South
(N
= 120). Today, any international constitutional committee may access all this administrative
history from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States in its quest to form a
modern, more inclusive national instrument.

Conclusions
The entire concept of an Internet-based digital collection of international constitutions, that
offers almost limitless examination of these critical instruments, reaches beyond just the few
countries that have the relatively unique tokens indigenous, aboriginal, or Indian(s) in their

political lexicons. In this gathering, it is possible to observe how each country has pronounced its
own national stance on issues such as discrimination (N constitutions = 145); slavery (N =
75); election (N = 187); court (N = 188); genocide (N = 22); children (N = 163);
and education (N = 182).[24] Indeed, Albania provides that “[c]hildren, the young, pregnant
women and new mothers have the right to special protection by the state” (Article 54 §1; see
Imholz, 1999, p. 14). Yet, while none of the words discrimination, genocide, children, young,
pregnant, women, mothers, or even education appears in the United States Constitution, their
presence elsewhere signals the evolution of more modern – and thus, now more inclusive –
national perspectives, even if the American document may have served as a useful, and almost
universal, model over the last two centuries (see Arato, 2009). Thus, one substantial advantage
of this particular database is that specific tokens may be scrutinized and the uncovered models
embedded in the identified constitutions may then be paired with other pertinent data, such as
those offered by other specific research endeavors,[25] to illuminate one or more aspects of a
nation’s particular political connection to an individual search token. The development of this
digitized library opens the geopolitical world to deeper inquiry. Consequently, while the task of
searching for tokens like genocide and children tends to pre-determine the point of reference in
such activities, there are constitutional parameters entailing other ideas that make this utility
particularly worthwhile. The resulting immediate feedback of the distribution of terms conveys a
prompt index of the importance of those concepts in the eyes of all these nations. This
supplemental reward of almost boundless inquiries means that fisheries (N = 16) and agriculture
(N = 58) may take their place alongside police (N = 134) and army (N = 71) to further fathom
the underlying psychology of a nation, or to unveil promptly that ecology is disappointingly
included in just seven of the current international instruments.
Finally, it is crucial to recall that these vehicles are the means by which nations boldly express
themselves to their neighbors, and that they are articulations of thought in which every term
– children, police, ecology, or otherwise – demanded judicious selection. Now, through the
Comparative Constitutions Project’s efforts, the designated political vocabularies from almost
every member of the United Nations may be found within Constitute. Further, when the United
Nations marked the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples in August 2013 by
announcing that there are “more than 5,000 distinct indigenous groups in some 90 countries,” it
publicized – as shown in conjunction with the forty-nine unique entries in Table I – that only
about half those nations have to date addressed fundamental issues affecting their indigenous
peoples. This new Constitute gathering has created an opportunity that calls for and facilitates
careful reflection upon, and useful comparative analyses among, these various avowals.
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Notes
1 Malaysia’s instrument is modeled in part upon the Constitution of India (Maddex, 2008, p.
275). The Penans are cited in the “Peoples of the Land: Spiritual and Cultural Roots of
Indigenous Societies” section of Coates (2004), along with more than twenty other groups from
around the world. Coates described the Penans as “symbols of the continued destruction of
indigenous territories and cultures” (p. 59). [back]
2 However, some native groups are concerned that “a precise, legal definition of the term
‘indigenous’ would impose standards or conditions for participation in human rights processes
that would be prejudicial to their interests” (Niezen, 2003, p. 18). [back]
3 The profound beauty of some of these indigenous people, the diversity of their costume, and
the grandeur of their environments may be seen in Nelson’s pictorial work (2013). Indeed, there
are images in that publication for groups from the nations of Argentina, Ecuador, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Russia, and Vanuatu that are among the forty-nine
countries identified in this study. [back]
4 With regard to a predecessor Canadian document, the 1939 Supreme Court of Canada case Re
Eskimos concluded that the constitutional status of the Eskimo within Canada (now known as the
Inuit; see the “Synonymy” section in Damas, 1984, pp. 5-7) should be the same as the standing
assigned to those groups identified as Indians. [back]
5 Udombana (2008, pp. 391-394) provided more insight into the use of – and the differences
between – these two tokens, at least in terms of an African perspective. [back]
6 For the first germane text uses of the word Indian, see the occurrences on each of the eight
pages of the initial document deposited in the Indian Affairs portion of the American State
Papers: the 1789 report entitled The Six Nations, the Wyandots, and others (1815, pp. 5-12).
The tokens indigenous and aboriginal do not appear in any of the 375 recognized American
Indian treaties that are available in searchable databases of early acknowledged instruments or
Charles J. Kappler’s Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties multi-volume compendium; see Bernholz,
Pytlik Zillig, Weakly, and Bajaber (2006), and Bernholz and Holcombe (2005), respectively.
Notice as well that the first appearance of the phrase native American in the US Congressional
Serial Set had nothing to do with American Indians. Rather, the expression appeared in an 1818
memorial that requested certificates of registry for a pair of vessels – the Stapleton and
the Ann – owned by two merchants and ship owners in Baltimore. The formal application to the
Senate concluded with the remark that “[y]our memorialists, therefore, with confidence appeal
to the justice and liberality of the government, that they will not be compelled to suffer their
vessels to lie rotting at their wharves for want of employment, while British vessels are allowed
to enter our ports, and to enjoy those rights and advantages, which are denied to the vessels
of native American citizens, when neither reasons of policy nor justice demand the sacrifice”
(Memorial of Thomas Tenant and George Stiles, of the City of Baltimore, merchants, and ship
owners, praying that certificates of registry may be granted to their vessels, 1818, p. 4;
emphasis added). The Committee of Commerce and Manufactures, to which the Senate referred
the application, recommended to that chamber that the claim was without merit. The earliest use
of native American in the American State Papers occurred in another shipping inquiry made
during the 1790s that involved an owner described as “Mr. James Yard, a native
American citizen, and merchant of Philadelphia” (France, 1832a, p. 637; emphasis added).
Clearly, both of the Serial Set and the State Papers documents used the descriptor native
American to identify individuals who were born in America, and not in Great Britain or
elsewhere. [back]

7 In Appendix II of a study purposely made under the purview of the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Anaya (2012, pp. 36-50) counted over 150 complaints
voiced by American Indians, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians. Many were based upon
“breached treaty promises” or nothing less than utter disregard by the federal government.
Groups – and many other governments – in all corners of the world are quite aware of such
shortcomings in the United States and are now predisposed to avoiding these difficulties in their
own futures. This is particularly so since, along with those in North America, indigenous entities
frequently have “historical claims to the specific land on which a nation has been created”
(Jabareen, 2011, p. 125), even if the Declaration itself has been criticized in terms of its overall
design and effectiveness (pp. 159-161). [back]
8 Ninety years ago, Woods (1925, p. 50) warned that “[t]he more detailed the provisions the
greater necessity for frequent amendment to meet changed conditions. One amendment calls for
another, and familiarity with many amendments gives freedom to propose many for which there
is no need. In the confusion of it citizens not only fail to respect and reverence the constitution,
but fail to know it and to recognize the difference between their constitution and their
statutes.” [back]
9 See Gilbert (2007, pp. 586-590) for thoughts on the development of a doctrine of indigenous
title, and Bulkan (2012) for words of caution regarding the evolution of today’s “indigenous
renaissance” and Gilbert’s hypothesis. [back]
10 In the same Pulitano volume, Martin (2012) examined the foundation of this veto behavior by
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. [back]
11 It should be noted that a number of other information providers have collected and organized
world constitutions, but many are available only by subscription. [back]
12 These member data were acquired from this United Nations site at the beginning of
November 2013, as were the indigenous, aboriginal, and Indian(s) search results
from Constitute. The organization’s roster and all inquiry outcomes were re-examined in January
2014. Between those dates, some minor corrections were made by the CCP to their suite of
constitutions to adjust typographical, spelling, formatting, and other textual difficulties (Jessie
Baugher, personal communication, 8 January 2014). [back]
13 The Appendix of The Endurance of National Constitutions listed “new, interim, and reinstated
constitutions in the CCP sample,” through the year 2005. This sample also included earlier
documents from Egypt, Fiji, New Zealand, and Tunisia, as well as from countries that no longer
exist, such as Austria-Hungary and Bavaria. [back]
14 Further, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are two of a number of countries considered to
use uncodified constitutions (see Norton, 1984, p. 60 for comparative United States and British
constitutional characteristics, and Tomkins, 2003, pp. 7-14). The forthcoming referendum
in
September 2014 in which voters will be asked the question “Should Scotland be an independent
Scotland?” has been preceded by the release of Scotland’s Future , a Scottish government
guide to independence. The document states that “[a] key responsibility of the first parliament of
an independent Scotland will be to put in place a written constitution to underpin the democratic
gains of independence. A written constitution will be a significant step forward for an
independent Scotland. It will replace the central principle of the UK constitution – the absolute
sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament – with the sovereignty of the people of Scotland,
which has been the central principle in the Scottish constitutional tradition.” It was further
declared that “[t]he creation of a written constitution will be an important development for
Scotland. A written constitution is more than a legal document. It is a statement of intent for the
nation. The process of coming together to develop, draft and approve such a document is an

important part of defining the sort of nation we wish Scotland to be” (p. 14; emphasis
added). [back]
15 At its release in October 2013, Constitute possessed a serious deficiency that still hinders full
use of this tool: there are no bibliographic data accompanying these constitutional documents.
This information is particularly important with regard to the materials from nations that do not
use English as one of their official languages, yet also publish their constitutions in that form.
Any such resulting instrument text has been created more as a convenience or courtesy than as
a necessity, format notwithstanding. One nation’s instrument will suffice to display the potential
burden. The Swiss constitution is available from the official government Web site
in a variety
of official and unofficial versions. The English
exemplar is presented with the disclaimer that
“English is not an official language of the Swiss Confederation. This translation is provided for
information purposes only and has no legal force” (emphasis added). Inspection of the provided
parameters reveals that the opening line of the Preamble declares “In the name of Almighty
God!” The Constitute Web variant begins with the pronouncement “In the name of God
Almighty!” Further, the government’s Preamble consists of ninety-nine words while
the Constitute variant has an additional one, but several phrases may be seen to vary: e.g., “the
strength of a people is measured by the well-being of its weakest members” versus “the strength
of people is measured by the welfare of the weakest of its members,” respectively. Provenance
data would thus be a useful supplement to these digitized texts, since the title pages of the
constitutions only have an announcement that “[t]his complete constitution has been generated
from excerpts of texts from the repository of the Comparative Constitutions Project, and
distributed on constituteproject.org.” [back]
16 As an additional manifestation of Canada’s attention to the term aboriginal, the name of the
federal Indian Affairs and Northern Development department was changed in May 2011 to
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (Aboriginal Affairs: A new name with an
uncertain meaning, 2011). [back]
17 The case is the same for the Roma, for whom only Finland and Kosovo have a place in their
constitutions to provide assurance that the Roma language will be a state-recognized one and,
solely in the latter nation, that they will have representation. The convoluted history of this
shunned group has entailed much of the same abuse, misunderstanding, and dispossession that
have encased other indigenous groups in geographic areas far beyond the boundaries of Europe
(see Keal, 2003, pp. 84-112, and Liégeois, 2007). [back]
18 Volume 3 of the Handbook of South American Indians (1945) provides ethnological
descriptions of these tribes. The seventh volume in that series has a useful index (1957). [back]
19 Columbus stated in his first letter of 14 March 1493 that “[t]hirty-three days after my
departure from Cadiz, I reached the Indian Sea.” Higginson (1877, p. 19; emphasis added)
recalls this error in his footnote to that statement: “Columbus always supposed that he had
reached India, and therefore always called the natives Indians.” Berkhofer (1988, pp. 522-523)
also discussed this naming process, including the perseveration of the name for the peoples – as
the Spanish token Indios changed into Indien in the French, into Indianer in the German, and
into Indian in the English – even after Columbus’ geographic mistake was established. [back]
20 See Cosculluela (1946) and Kimber (1991/1992) for more on the original inhabitants of
Cuba. [back]
21 The official Government of New Zealand settlement site
and the Australian Prescribed
Bodies Corporate
one have more on these programs. [back]

22 The Bureau of Indian Affairs at the Department of the Interior publishes periodically a list
entitled Indian entities recognized and eligible to receive services from the United States Bureau
of Indian Affairs. In 2013, the inventory encompassed 566 entries and consisted of members
from both the lower forty-eight states and Alaska; there are no acknowledged Native Hawaiian
groups. Canada has a searchable First Nation Profiles
page on the Internet. [back]
23 The federal government uses blood quantum as a means to determine race, not tribal
affiliation. Adjustments to tribal rolls following Department of the Interior recognition, based
upon reduced threshold blood quantum amounts for tribal enrollment to permit the inclusion of
additional members, have led to several court cases including one with the Grand Traverse Band
of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and another involving the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode Island
(Gover, 2010, pp. 123-130; and for a more inclusive perspective, see Villizor, 2008). [back]
24 Other social issues like prostitution (N constitutions = 4); pornography (N = 2); racism (N =
19); human trafficking (N = 4); and the prohibition of same sex marriages (N = 5) are also
considered by some nations within their documents. Indeed, the list of potential parameters is
almost limitless: “[t]he Rhododendron Arboreum shall be the national flower, Crimson shall be
the national colour, the Cow shall be the national animal and the Lophophorus shall be
the national bird of Nepal” (Article 7 §2; see Wolfrum and Grote, 2007, p. 5; emphasis
added). [back]
25 See, e.g., Andolina (2003) and Zamosc (2007) for observations on Ecuador. [back]

